Appendix A describes how our test score data was collected and how the tests were scored, and Appendix B details the derivation of the bias term in the estimate of the variance of the classroom effects. Appendix C documents how data entry errors in teacher ids could lead to greater bias in TVA estimates that control for child fixed effects, while Appendix D describes the details of the teacher hiring policy simulation.
Appendix A: Test Data Data Collection
In each round of the LEAPS data collection, we tested students in math, Urdu (the vernacular), and English. To avoid the possibility of cheating, project staff, with clear instructions not to interfere, administered the test directly to students. Test booklets were retrieved after class, so there was no missing testing material.
Tests were scored and equated across the four rounds using Item Response Theory, yielding scores in each subject with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (Das and Zajonc, 2010) . Item response theory weights questions differently according to their difficulty and allows us to equate tests over years so that a standard deviation gain in year 1 is equivalent to a standard deviation gain in year 4 in terms of student knowledge. The tests could be equated because we included linking questions across any two years and for some questions, across multiple years. Table 1 provides more information on the sources of variation for the TVA calculations. In year one, since only 3rd graders were tested, very few students were observed in schools where more than one classroom was tested. In future years, some students were held back, others were promoted, and another sample of 3rd graders was added in year 3, allowing students in a larger number of classrooms to be tested. Columns 1 and 2 describe the sample used to calculate the cross-school TVA estimates. Columns 3 and 4 describe the variation used to calculate the within-school TVA measures.
Scoring Tests
To score the tests that we administered to teachers and students, we separately estimate the IRT scores for years 1 to 4 for the students, recovering an ability parameter for each student-year combination, as well as 3 parameters (per test question) that measure the difficulty of each test item. We then use the item parameters from this student-level IRT estimation as inputs into the ability parameter estimates for the teacher. This procedure is only valid if the structural assumptions underlying this extrapolation are true.
That is, although teachers can, on average, have a higher ability parameter, their likelihood of correctly answering a question conditional on ability should be fully determined by the structural 3-parameter logistic equation with the item parameters as inputs. To test this, we can use a χ 2 test comparing the observed response pattern among teachers with the predicted response pattern from the student-level IRT estimation. In Appendix Figures A11-A13 , we produce the item-level observed responses from teachers plotted against the predicted responses based on the student-level estimation separately for English, mathematics, and Urdu.
Since the χ 2 test tends to be underpowered in small samples (and is never rejected in our case), we view these figures as more informative about the fit of the IRT model. The figures that we present here treat all the teachers as a single cross-section, including teachers who are tested multiple times. We also perform a similar computation retaining a single observation per teacher and find exactly the same patterns. The figures for all 3 subjects consistently show: (a) that teachers are performing at the upper range of the student ability distribution and that (b) that for most questions, the predicted response pattern from the IRT model match the patterns observed in the data. This close match could be caused by the fact that there is not much variation in the structural item curve in the upper range of the ability distribution. However, where there there is considerable variation (see, for instance, math items 38 and 40, Urdu items 13, 25, and 46
or English items 41, 44, and 48), we find similar concordance between predicted and observed responses.
There are a few specific questions (for instance, math items 33 and 34, Urdu item 22, and English item 50)
for which the fit is poor, but we could find no clear pattern to explain this relatively poorer fit. In math, the items were a harder division problem and a simple arithmetic problem (the teachers are less likely to get it right, conditional on ability); for Urdu, item 22 is an antonym, and for English, item 50 is a reading comprehension question where students read a passage and answer a question based on that passage. One possible explanation is that teaching has changed over time to stress these kinds of tasks more. This may lead older teachers to perform worse on these items.
Appendix B: Derivation of Bias
In this appendix, we derive an estimate of φ, the term capturing the sampling bias in the expression
The notation here is defined in the same way as in the body of the paper. To derive φ, we first note that
, where δ jst = θ s + θ js + θ jst and N jt is the number of students taught by teacher j in year t. Furthermore, assume υ ijt is homoskedastic with variance
and a little algebra shows that
Then, we can recognize that 2E( δjst N jt i υijt N 2 jt ) = 0 since δ jst and υ ijt are independent and E(υ ijt ) = 0 by construction. Additionally, we can recognize that E(
which is equivalent to
Appendix C: Incorrect Variation in Teacher Switching Due to Data Entry Errors
In this appendix, we show how a small amount of data misentry can lead to a large amount of bias when we include child fixed effects in the TVA estimation. Suppose that 1 percent of teacher IDs are randomly entered incorrectly. If 10 percent of students change teachers each year, when identifying variation comes only from the test scores of students who change teachers, these incorrect entries account for 9 percent of the variation. To arrive at this number, note that there are three cases where a student-year observation will provide identifying variation in a specification that includes child fixed effects: (1) the teacher ID was incorrectly entered, but no switch actually occurred (probability = 0.01 × 0.9 = 0.009), (2) the teacher ID was correctly entered and a switch occurred (probability = 0.99 × 0.1 = .099), and (3) the ID was incorrectly entered and a switch occurred (probability = 0.1 × 0.01 = 0.001). Then the probability that the teacher ID is mis-attributed in an observation that provides identifying variation is 0.01 (0.009+0.099+0.001) = 0.09. In order to assess potential bias more formally, consider a case where students are identical and TVA is randomly distributed, so there is no correlation between a student's future teacher's TVA and his current teacher's TVA as long as she changes teachers. Now, also assume that a student has a probability p of changing teachers each year, and an ID has a probability e of being incorrectly entered. Then, when the TVA of teacher is calculated for teacher j, it will be a weighted mean of the teachers true TVA and the TVAs of teachers of any students with mis-attributed IDs. Therefore,
where T V A j is the mean TVA in the teacher population and T V A j is the estimate of the TVA for teacher j. This expression formalizes the intuition that the bias decreases in the true probability of switching p and increases in the error rate e.
Appendix D: Teacher Hiring Policy
The policy simulations in this paper resemble those of Staiger and Rockoff (2010) . We simulate policies that fire the observed worst X percent of teachers (allowing X to be 5, 10, 50, 60, 70, and 80) after T years of observation (allowing T =1, 2, and 5).
We start by simulating TVA for a set of 100,000 teachers. Teachers value-added in mean test scores is drawn from a distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.148 (consistent with our estimates in Table 2 ). The initial population of teachers are assigned integer experience levels, which are drawn with equal probabilities from 0-30 years. We decrease a teachers value-added by 0.08 if she has 0 or 1 years of experience (consistent with our estimates of the inexperience penalty in Table 3 ). We allow teachers to work for 30 years before they retire and are replaced with new teachers drawn from the normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 0.148. We then simulate the policy, allowing the distribution of employed teachers' quality and experience levels to change over time.
Each year, we assign each teacher 28 new students (the average public school class size in our data). We simulate each students mean test scores as a linear function of mean TVA, a time-variant classroom specific shock, and a time-variant, idiosyncratic, individual shock. We ignore school-level, time invariant shocks since these are perfectly observable to policy makers with enough years of data. Following our calculations in Section 4, we assume these shocks are normally distributed, with mean 0 and the variances documented in Table 2 . Consistent with a probation period of T years, after T years of observation, we estimate a teachers observed TVA based on their students test scores. Teachers whose observed TVA is below the X percentile of the observed TVA distribution are not confirmed and are replaced with new, inexperienced teachers with TVA drawn from N (0, 0.148).
To solve for the steady state effect of this policy on mean test scores, we simulate the policy in each year until = |T V A t − T V A t−1 |/|T V A t−1 |< 0.0005. Additionally, to provide insight into how long it would take the policy to achieve its steady state effects, we report the mean TVAs of teachers under different policies at t=2, 5, and 15 years. Since the means in a given year may be affected by particularly bad or good draws of new teachers, we bootstrap these values by running the policy simulation 200 times for each policy and report the 95% confidence interval for the mean TVA values. We typically find that these confidence intervals are quite tight. [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Changes in test scores are calculated by averaging over the difference between a student's test scores in time t and time t − 1. Household assets and school basic and extra facilities are predicted from a principal components analysis of indicator variables for the presence of different assets, and school facilities and are normalized by year observed. The household asset measure is the first factor of a principal components analysis of indicator variables for ownership of beds, a radio, a television, a refrigerator, a bicycle, a plow, agricultural tools, tables, fans, a tractor, cattle, goats, chicken, watches, a motor rickshaw, a scooter, a car, a telephone, and a tubewell following methods discussed by Filmer and Pritchett (2001) . The two indices for school facilities are constructed as the first predicted component from principles components analyses of indicator variables for "basic" and "extra" school facilities. Extra school facilities consist of a library, computer, sports, hall, school wall, fans, and electricity. The basic facilities consist of whether the school has desks/chairs as a seating arrangement, blackboards per child, toilets per child and classrooms per child. This table reports counts of the number of teachers who are observed teaching only Grade 3, only Grade 4, only Grade 5, only Grades 3 and 4, only Grades 4 and 5, and Grades 3, 4, and 5 by how many times they were observed in the public sector. The restricted sample excludes teachers who are ever observed teaching two classes of students who appear to be the same in two consecutive years (25 percent or more of the students in year t were taught by the same teacher in year t − 1). This table reports estimates of the association between teachers' test scores on the same test given to students and teacher characteristics. The association between female and content knowledge in the public sector cannot be credibly estimated in the presence of school fixed effects because the public sector is not co-educational. Very few public schools (29) are observed with both male and female teachers over the course of the sample. Observations are at the teacher level and characteristics are time invariant. In cases where a teacher was tested more than once, the outcome variables are the average across multiple test scores. All regressions include district (odd columns) or school (even columns) fixed effects. The Within-Adjusted R Squared reports the adjusted R Squared within districts (odd columns) or schools (even columns). Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. This table reports estimates of the association between TVA and teacher characteristics for the samples of teacher for whom test scores are available. Columns 1 and 2 include the set of teachers for whom there are any test scores, and Columns 3 and 4 include those who were tested in at least two different years. The association between female and TVA in the public sector cannot be credibly estimated in the presence of school fixed effects because the public sector is not co-educational. Very few public schools (29) are observed with both male and female teachers over the course of the sample. The F-statistic is for a F-test of all the covariates. All regressions include district (odd columns) or school (even columns) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Columns 1 and 2 report the correlations between the baseline TVA estimates in English, math, and Urdu, and TVA estimates that are calculated controlling for gender, age, household assets, basic and extra school facilities indices, mother and father education, whether the classroom is multigrade, and student-teacher ratios. The household asset measure is the first factor of a principal components analysis of indicator variables for ownership of beds, a radio, a television, a refrigerator, a bicycle, a plow, agricultural tools, tables, fans, a tractor, cattle, goats, chicken, watches, a motor rickshaw, a scooter, a car, a telephone, and a tubewell following methods discussed by Filmer and Pritchett (2001) . The two indices for school facilities are constructed as the first predicted component from principles components analyses of indicator variables for "basic" and "extra" school facilities. Extra school facilities consist of a library, computer, sports, hall, school wall, fans, and electricity. The basic facilities consist of whether the school has desks/chairs as its seating arrangement, blackboards per child, toilets per child and classrooms per child. Columns 3 and 4 report the correlations between the baseline TVA estimates and estimates that additionally include controls for classroom-level mean lagged test scores and mean household assets. Odd columns report the correlations for the across-school TVA estimates, while even columns report the correlations for the within-school TVA estimates. This table reports counts of the number of private school teachers who are observed teaching only Grade 3, only Grade 4, only Grade 5, only Grades 3 and 4, only Grades 4 and 5, and Grades 3, 4, and 5 by how many times they were observed. The restricted sample excludes teachers who are ever observed teaching two classes of students who appear to be the same in two consecutive years (25 percent or more of the students in year t were taught by the same teacher in year t − 1). This table presents the breakdown of the data used to calculate within-and across-school TVAs for the private sector. Within-school TVAs require teachers to teach in schools where more than one teacher has tested students (so that the mean school effect is not equal to the sole teachers TVA). The sample of students driving variation in the within-school TVAs are the students who attend schools where more than one teacher has tested students. This table reports the effect of receiving a 1sd higher classroom, school, teacher, or individual idiosyncratic shock on students' subject-level test scores, as well as the average effect across the three, in the private sector. Test scores are estimated with IRT. To arrive at these numbers, we use equation (1) to estimate teacher-year fixed effects in the panel dataset of student test scores. Denote δ jst as the teacher-year fixed effect for teacher j in school s in year t. Then, the school variance is Cov( δ jst , δ j st ), the teacher variance is Cov( δ jst , δ jst ) − Cov( δ jst , δ j st ), the classroom variance is the variance of δ j st minus the sampling bias, which we solve for analytically in Appendix B, and the individual variance is the variance of the residuals. In Panel A, the sample includes all students and teachers in public schools. In Panel B, the restricted sample excludes teachers who are ever observed teaching two classes of students who appear to be the same in two consecutive years (25 percent or more of the students in year t were taught by the same teacher in year t−1). This table tests whether better students are allocated to contract teachers. The first column estimates trends in student test scores before the receipt of a contract teacher in schools that did and did not receive contract teachers by regressing mean test scores on a continuous measure of the survey year, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the school received a contract teacher in the future, and their interaction, controlling for district fixed effects. The sample is restricted to schools that had not yet received the contract teacher. The next column compares the test score trends of students within schools who did or did not receive contract teachers before the receipt of the contract teacher by regressing mean test scores on a continuous measure of the survey year, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student received a contract teacher in the future, and their interaction, controlling for district fixed effects. The sample is restricted to students who had not yet been taught by a contract teacher. In Columns 1 and 2, an observation is a student-year. The final regression regresses an indicator for whether a student ever had a contract teacher on their mean test score gains (residualized by testing round and grade) in the years prior to receiving a contract teacher, controlling for district fixed effects. In this sample, each student is observed once. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. This table reports the fuzzy RD effects of temporary contract status on mean TVA for different bandwidths (2-10 years), as well as p-values from cluster bootstrapped standard errors, which account for estimation error in the TVA's. Contract status is instrumented for with an indicator variable for whether a teacher was hired after 1998. All regressions contain linear time trends in month hired, which are allowed to differ before and after the budgetary shock, and district fixed effects. Regressions also include controls for student teacher ratios, student socioeconomic status, and whether a classroom is multigrade. Cross-school TVA estimates are de-meaned at the district-level. Observations are at the teacher level, and standard errors are clustered at the month hired level in the regression discontinuity specifications. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels according to the analytic standard errors. Figure This figure plots the distribution of private school teachers' test scores on the same tests administered to students in math, English, and Urdu. Each teacher-year is treated as a separate observation. This figure reports the number of public school teachers and students in the LEAPS sample and the breakdown of how many teachers and students are observed in 1, 2, 3 and 4 rounds of data collection. This figure reports estimates of the marginal treatment effects for each additional 3 years of teaching experience. The estimates are obtained by regressing student test scores on lagged student test scores interacted with child class fixed effects, year fixed effects, and indicator variables for having greater than or equal to 3 years of experience, 6 years of experience, and so on up to 27 years of experience. The sample was restricted to public school teachers with 30 or fewer years of experience. This figure plots the distribution of TVA estimates that were calculated using mutually exclusive random samples of data from year 2, year 3, year 4, years 2 and 3, years 3 and 4, years 2 and 4, and all three years. The samples are mutually exclusive to avoid mechanical correlations in the TVA estimates. This figure plots the predicted portion of teachers who got each math item correct according to the IRT estimates (using item-level parameters estimated with the student data) against the actual portion of teachers who got that item correct in the data. This figure plots the predicted portion of teachers who got each English item correct according to the IRT estimates (using item-level parameters estimated with the student data) against the actual portion of teachers who got that item correct in the data This figure plots the predicted portion of teachers who got each Urdu item correct according to the IRT estimates (using item-level parameters estimated with the student data) against the actual portion of teachers who got that item correct in the data
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